On June 30, 2026, a significant development unfolded in global diplomacy. As commercial vessels moved through the Strait of Hormuz near Bandar Abbas, Iran, three leaders from different spheres made a shared acknowledgment. Washington hailed a diplomatic breakthrough on the same day.
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif confirmed that ballistic missiles were never under discussion. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian maintained that missiles would not feature in any future agreements. At the G7 summit in Evian, President Trump characterized missiles as weapons with limited impact that do not threaten planetary destruction.
The U.S.–Iran Memorandum of Understanding notably includes a commitment for Iran not to develop nuclear weapons. However, it says nothing about ballistic missiles, which Iran has used extensively in the region. This omission stands as the structural essence of the agreement, not a simple detail.
By omitting ballistic missiles from a 14-point framework, Washington has made a significant decision. It separates nuclear warheads from their delivery systems, recognized by Iran as a cohesive deterrence strategy. While a nuclear program without missiles may be harmless, a missile program without nuclear warheads remains a potent military threat.
The 2024 missile attacks on Israel highlighted vulnerabilities in missile defense systems. By ignoring ballistic missiles, the memorandum effectively validates Iran’s current strike capabilities.
This diplomatic choice alters the regional threat landscape. It provides international acknowledgment to Iran’s primary conventional weapon without addressing potential threats. Iran joined negotiations with its missile infrastructure intact, while Washington’s need for an agreement outweighed any concessions from Tehran.
The U.S. framed missiles as a separate issue even before talks concluded. Tehran held firm to this stance. Including missiles would have required discussions with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, slowing the process.
Iran stands to gain substantial economic benefits through unfrozen assets during a 60-day period. These funds could enhance Iran’s missile production capabilities without constraints on the development of missile components.
Regional allies like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE face increased risks from the missile capabilities left unaddressed by the memorandum. They may pursue independent defense strategies and partnerships.
This memorandum signals a shift in U.S. deterrence strategy. It appears less focused on prevention and more on managing consequences. Iran views its missile program as essential for its survival and regional influence.
The agreement’s omission of missiles reinforces Iran’s strategic approach of expanding conventional power while negotiating from a position of strength. Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s remarks on Iran’s proxy wars emphasize this doctrine.
Without missiles as part of future negotiations, the agreement solidifies their exclusion. Once Iran shows partial compliance with nuclear terms, renewed pressure to include missiles seems improbable.
The memorandum, focusing solely on potential nuclear threats, misses addressing current missile threats. It inadvertently validates the expansion of regional threats through financial means.
Meaningful progress demands that missiles become a core aspect of future talks. The current arrangement suggests the U.S. is financing the consolidation of threats rather than mitigating them.