In August 2001, key actions were taken by U.S. intelligence agencies that highlight the ongoing efforts and failures in the lead-up to 9/11. Margaret Gillespie, an FBI analyst working with the bin Laden station at the Counterterrorist Center (CTC), stepped forward on August 23. She requested the addition of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi to the Department of State’s watch-list. This move aimed to prevent them from obtaining visas to enter the United States.
By this point, U.S. Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had assessed that al-Mihdhar was likely present in the United States. However, there was no evidence of al-Hazmi’s departure. Concurrently, FBI headquarters instructed its New York and Los Angeles field offices to conduct searches for these individuals. Unfortunately, both offices were unable to locate al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi effectively. Notably, the Los Angeles office received the search request only on September 11, 2001.
The CTC was proactive in pushing for their inclusion in watch lists managed by the State Department, Customs, and INS. Though these lists, like State’s VISA/VIPER for visas, TIPOFF system, and the Treasury Enforcement Communication System, intended to restrict entry, they did not apply to domestic travel. On August 24, both al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar found themselves on these watch lists. Subsequent actions included marking al-Mihdhar as “armed and dangerous” and revoking his visa on September 4.
Another dimension involved separate FBI elements who possessed fragmented pieces of information. This included suspicions linked to Zacarias Moussaoui and a pivotal memo from the Phoenix Field Office dated July 10. The memo raised alarms about radical Islamists engaging in flight training in the U.S., suggesting a coordinated effort by Osama bin Laden.
The memo requested four actions: compiling a list of flight schools, establishing liaising relationships, discussing concerns with the intelligence community, and accessing visa information of prospective flight students.
Despite these recommendations, FBI headquarters did not act before the events of 9/11. Moreover, a lack in inter-office information exchange was evident. Both Minneapolis and Phoenix Field Offices lacked knowledge of the other’s findings, including Moussaoui and al-Mihdhar.
The failures in sharing information within the FBI reflect deeper issues. Misplaced focus and lack of strategic imagination hindered significant intelligence sharing that reforms alone cannot solve.