In September 1943, troops from the First Canadian Division launched a successful attack on the Italian town of Potenza. This action turned a potential defeat for the British and American forces into a victory. Fast forward 83 years, questions arise about whether today’s Canadian Army could repeat such a feat alongside U.S. forces in major combat or even contribute significantly in distant operations. Currently, the answer is no. The reason lies in the army’s optimization for ‘contribution warfare’ — involvement in multinational coalitions for operations excluding large-scale intense combat.
After the Cold War, it became practical for middle powers like Canada to focus on peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. However, the strategic landscape has since shifted. The Canadian Army today is not suited for the current needs. Nor is it the army the U.S. requires Canada to have. In this context, Ottawa introduced Inflection Point 2025. This plan aims to transform the Canadian Army into a warfighting force suitable for sustained major combat against peer adversaries. Yet, this remains a plan for now. As Robbie Burns might reflect, plans can falter.
For Inflection Point to succeed, Ottawa needs to do more than adjust organization charts. Investment in recruitment, equipment, training, and a sustainable system is essential to establish fully capable Canadian combat units. Confidence in these investments materializing soon is limited. Beginning with recruitment, the Inflection Point relies on assumptions. The goal is to fill a 3,000-soldier gap from last year’s recruitment and add 8,500 more personnel by 2040. Yet, this is speculative, not guaranteed. Historical trends offer little assurance that Canada can recruit, train, and retain the necessary personnel to meet these targets.
Moving to procurement, a competitive Canadian unit requires top-tier equipment suitable for evolving battlespaces. Canada’s procurement system — even after recent reforms — is not structured for rapid delivery. It prioritizes job creation in Canada and diversification from U.S. arms, sidelining the army’s equipment needs. Even addressing procurement, the challenge of sustainment persists. Building sufficient stocks and supply lines for a division-sized unit remains daunting. As expressed by Gen. Wayne Eyre in 2023, Canada’s resources would quickly deplete against Ukraine War expenditure levels. Replenishing essential munitions could span years, compounding the sustainment challenge.
Another issue is doctrine. The Canadian Army, akin to many NATO counterparts, slowly embraces tactics and organizational changes deemed vital by the Ukraine conflict. While understandable, this hesitancy raises concerns that despite Inflection Point’s insights, Canada’s army may remain under-prepared, lacking the intended capabilities.
For Americans, this might appear solely as Ottawa’s problem. However, Canada’s combat effectiveness on foreign grounds greatly impacts Washington. The success of a future American campaign might hinge on the readiness of a well-prepared Canadian unit, echoing the Potenza victory of 1943. Though a rerun of Salerno would be unwelcome, if it happens, the hope is for a thoroughly prepared Canadian Army, advancing past its inflection point and capable of repeating a triumph like Potenza.
Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota, and a senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy.
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