October 28, 2026

Examining the Lack of Progress in U.S.-Iran Relations

By November 3, three key events are expected not to occur regarding the situation with Iran. Firstly, the U.S. government is not anticipated to publicly address the fate of uranium last tracked by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), nor confirm who will verify its handling or outline consequences if Iran refuses compliance. Secondly, Iran is not expected to grant the IAEA scheduled access to Isfahan by providing specific dates and sites. Lastly, the U.S. and Iran are unlikely to agree on a mutual shipping arrangement, which would involve Iran ceasing attacks on commercial vessels and the U.S. opting to board or redirect sanctioned tankers instead of sinking them.

Should none of these occur, it would indicate that the pause implemented by President Trump is merely a timeline rather than an act of diplomacy. Conversely, if any of these conditions were met, it would challenge this assumption. Currently, the pause does not offer a public incentive for either party to act before elections.

Trump’s commitment from October 8 maintains the blockade on Iranian ports and ties military action to the electoral calendar, unlike his previous pause in April which demanded immediate actions from Iran. Instead, the current pause simply requests Iran to delay without providing additional incentives.

Before Israel’s strikes in June 2025, the IAEA estimated that Iran held 441 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent. In March, IAEA Director Rafael Grossi reported approximately 200 kilograms were likely stored in Isfahan tunnels and at Natanz, though the exact status remains unverified since the sites were bombed. Accounting for all nuclear material is critical, despite arguments focusing on Iran’s enrichment capabilities. Without concrete data, negotiations on nuclear limits remain impractical.

Vice President JD Vance calls for a significant reduction in enrichment capacity. However, this needs to be quantifiable. Washington must specify the acceptable status of the remaining uranium, designate verification authority, and establish consequences for non-compliance.

A potential shipping agreement should impose costs on both sides. Iran would cease commercial vessel attacks, and the U.S. would interdict rather than destroy sanctioned tankers unless directly attacked. Such steps narrow military options and could uphold the port blockade, altering only enforcement tactics.

Iran, during negotiations in New York, reportedly demanded the lifting of the blockade, the release of frozen assets, and cessation of hostilities on all fronts, but these demands were rejected. Progress hinges on clarifying demands into actionable steps. Iran’s internal dynamics, implied by the motion to impeach Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and comments by the Supreme National Security Council’s secretary, suggest contested authority.

This pause serves to test whether Tehran can commit to any verifiable actions. If it can, access dates should be scheduled. If no agreement or terms are specified by either side, it remains unclear if this results from unwillingness or inability. Addressing this ambiguity is essential to progress.

While these steps alone do not signify peace, they could represent the minimum foundation for an eventual agreement. Iran’s current patience could indicate strategic waiting, rather than engagement, reflecting the pause’s limited diplomatic impact. Effective negotiation requires more than military preparation; it needs clear, measurable objectives to define ultimate goals.

Charbel A. Antoun is a Washington-based journalist and writer concentrating on U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa.

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