The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is succinctly stated in 28 words: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” This single sentence encapsulates the essence of American federalism.

For approximately six decades following the New Deal, the courts largely regarded this amendment as a constitutional nicety without much practical force. That perspective has shifted somewhat over the past thirty years, but the changes fall short of addressing the extensive structural damage caused during the era dominated by the Commerce Clause.

James Madison expressed in The Federalist No. 45 that the powers given to the federal government are limited and defined, while those left to the States are broad and indefinite. The Founders intentionally designed a government with enumerated powers to prevent unbridled authority driven by ambition. The Tenth Amendment was intended to clearly define these limits: federal power stops where the Constitution does not explicitly allow it to go.

The New Deal significantly dismantled this ideal. In the case of Wickard v. Filburn (1942), the Supreme Court upheld the federal regulation of wheat a farmer grew for personal use by arguing its aggregate economic effect on interstate commerce brought it under Congress’s jurisdiction. This interpretation effectively transformed non-commercial, local activities into interstate commerce, rendering Congress’s enumerated powers a quaint historical notion instead of a functioning constraint.

The court began reevaluating this approach thirty years ago. U.S. v. Lopez (1995) marked a turning point by challenging Congress’s use of the Commerce Clause for the first time in six decades. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s narrow majority concluded that the Gun-Free School Zones Act overstepped congressional authority because having a firearm near a school was not an economic activity significantly affecting interstate commerce. Similarly, U.S. v. Morrison (2000) applied this rationale to the civil provisions of the Violence Against Women Act. In NFIB v. Sebelius (2012), the court dismissed the commerce justification for the Affordable Care Act’s individual insurance mandate.

Further developments included West Virginia v. EPA (2022) which initiated the major questions doctrine, requiring clear congressional intent before delegating broad regulatory power to agencies. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024) overruled Chevron deference, which had allowed courts to defer to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Courts now independently judge what regulations agencies can enforce, eliminating a tool that let agencies dictate their own boundaries.

These judicial decisions reflect movement toward restoring limits, but do not erase the decades of expansion. The most impactful Tenth Amendment doctrine is anti-commandeering, separate from Commerce Clause judgments. In Printz v. United States (1997), Justice Scalia asserted that federal authority could not compel state officers to carry out federal duties. Instead, the Constitution envisioned the federal government acting through its own officials.

Murphy v. NCAA (2018) extended this to legislative commandeering, prohibiting Congress from controlling state legislative actions. A prominent example is sanctuary city policy, where the federal government cannot force local enforcement of immigration laws. Printz and Murphy clarified federal limits, but anti-commandeering is often misunderstood. It safeguards states from becoming federal tools without consent, rather than relieving state officials of their duties to their constituents.

In places like California, there is a pattern of aggressive regulation where federal standards are lax, while simultaneously claiming state autonomy where federal requirements prove inconvenient. This dual approach includes immigration, environmental, and public pension policies.

The Tenth Amendment’s defense of state power is not inherently conservative; states can abuse the autonomy it safeguards as easily as the federal government can exceed the powers it restricts. The aim was not to guarantee wise state decisions, but to ensure the government nearest to and accountable to the people retained decision-making power. A federal government consistently overriding state policy in areas such as education, healthcare, and water management does not enhance state judgment but instead dismantles the accountability structure voters rely on to amend poor state decisions without resorting to federal litigation.

Madison’s concise provision intended to guard against this, recognizing the systematic political incentives favoring federal expansion, which awards legislators and agencies with credit and authority respectively. Although recent court rulings have brought some boundaries to this expansion, the foundational map remains largely unchanged.

Jay Rogers is a financial professional with more than 30 years of experience in private equity, private credit, hedge funds, and wealth management.